Research
We work broadly in computer security and privacy. Our research is at the intersection of trusted computing, system security, program analysis and formal verification. Specifically, our goals are to lay down the foundations for building large-scale secure systems with long-term impact. A lot of our work furthers this goal by showcasing the practical feasibility of securing existing and emerging software systems.
Projects & Code
We aim to make all our code open source and freely available:
- external page eXpect: On the Security Implications of Violations in AXI Implementations
- external page Rolling in the Shadows: Analyzing the Extraction of MEV Across Layer-2 Rollups
- external page WeSee: Using Malicious #VC Interrupts to Break AMD SEV-SNP
- external page Heckler: Breaking Confidential VMs with Malicious Interrupts
- external page Acai: Protecting Accelerator Execution with Arm Confidential Computing Architecture
- external page Is Your Wallet Snitching On You?
- external page Elasticlave: An Efficient Memory Model for Enclaves
- external page SmashEx: Smashing SGX Enclaves Using Exceptions
- external page BesFS: A SGX Filesystem with Coq Proofs
- external page Ratel: A system to run unmodified Linux binaries on SGX enclaves
- external page Keystone: An Open Framework for Architecting Trusted Execution Environments
- external page NPAQ: Neural Property Approximate Quantifier
- external page SGXDPDK Firewall: A firewall application that leverages DPDK for performance and SGX for security
- external page Panoply: Low-TCB Linux Applications with SGX Enclaves
- external page DexterJS: Auto-Patching DOM-based XSS At Scale