Research
We work broadly in computer security and privacy. Our research is at the intersection of trusted computing, system security, program analysis and formal verification. Specifically, our goals are to lay down the foundations for building large-scale secure systems with long-term impact. A lot of our work furthers this goal by showcasing the practical feasibility of securing existing and emerging software systems.
Projects & Code
We aim to make all our code open source and freely available:
- external pageWeSeecall_made: Using Malicious #VC Interrupts to Break AMD SEV-SNP
- external pageHecklercall_made: Breaking Confidential VMs with Malicious Interrupts
- external pageAcaicall_made: Protecting Accelerator Execution with Arm Confidential Computing Architecture
- external pageIs Your Wallet Snitching On You?call_made
- external pageElasticlavecall_made: An Efficient Memory Model for Enclaves
- external pageSmashExcall_made: Smashing SGX Enclaves Using Exceptions
- external pageBesFScall_made: A SGX Filesystem with Coq Proofs
- external pageRatel:call_made A system to run unmodified Linux binaries on SGX enclaves
- external pageKeystone:call_made An Open Framework for Architecting Trusted Execution Environments
- external pageNPAQ:call_made Neural Property Approximate Quantifier
- external pageSGXDPDK Firewall:call_made A firewall application that leverages DPDK for performance and SGX for security
- external pagePanoply:call_made Low-TCB Linux Applications with SGX Enclaves
- external pageDexterJS:call_made Auto-Patching DOM-based XSS At Scale